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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
As the United States enters the fuel-scarce 1980's, national attention
centers on the energy-rich West. Vast amounts of coal, oil, natural gas, ura-
nium, and oil shale lie untapped in the region encompassed within the
Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction. Full-scale development of these minerals will
significantly strain existing environments. Many mineral deposits occur on
federal lands subject to numerous federal environmental and multi-use stat-
utes. Preserving valuable park and wilderness areas while extracting a suffi-
cient amount of energy fuels presents both a challenge and a dilemma. As
the pace of mineral development quickens, legal conflicts will develop be-
tween and among producers, distributors, carriers, environmental groups,
Indian tribes, private land owners, and federal, state, and local governments.
Increasingly, these disputes are being litigated in the federal courts.
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided nineteen
cases involving natural resources issues. Several of the cases were of major
importance. Issues associated with the use and control of Indian lands were
addressed in six Tenth Circuit decisions. A Tenth Circuit case wherein the
court of appeals upheld the right of Indian tribes to place a severance tax on
minerals removed from reservation lands, if upheld by the United States
Supreme Court, will greatly increase tribal revenues for those tribes located
on mineral-rich lands. Attempts to alter the terms of existing natural gas
contracts also occupied the court's time. In a decision with potentially far-
reaching consequences, the Tenth Circuit cleared the way for coal slurry
pipeline companies to obtain rights of way across railroad lands.
This survey will examine the rationale employed by the Tenth Circuit
in deciding these natural resource issues. A more extended analysis will ac-
company the discussion of those decisions of major significance.
I. INDIAN LANDS
A number of important issues relating to Indian lands and Indian rights
were presented to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the past term.
The right of executive-order reservation tribes to impose mineral severance
taxes upon non-Indians, state criminal jurisdiction over Indian hunting and
fishing activities on trust lands, the effect of anti-alienation statutes on allot-
ted lands, the scope of responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior under
the Southern Paiute Judgment Distribution Act, the necessity of joining the
United States in municipal easement condemnations of reservation lands,
and the jurisdiction of state courts to determine Indian water rights were
among the plethora of legal issues addressed by the court during the past
year.
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A. Vahdit of Indian Severance Taxation
Perhaps the most significant public lands decision of the Tenth Circuit
was Merrion v. Jicartlla Apache Tribe,' a case wherein the court upheld the
right of Indian tribes to impose a mineral severance tax on non-Indians pro-
ducing oil and gas from leases on executive-order reservation lands. 2 This
holding will, in all probability, allow Indian tribes on mineral-rich reserva-
tions to vastly increase their revenues.
Merrion, under federal leases, produced oil and gas from wells located
on the Jicarilla Apache tribe's reservation in northern New Mexico. In 1976,
the Jicarilla Tribal Council passed an ordinance imposing a severance tax on
all oil and gas extracted and removed from the reservation. The ordinance
was passed pursuant to a revised tribal constitution adopted in 1968, 3 which,
in turn, was adopted under authority granted by the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 4 After the ordinance was approved by the Secretary,
Merrion and other federal oil and gas lessees with wells on the reservation
sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico. These lessees brought the action in order to
prohibit enforcement of the tax.
After a hearing on the merits, the trial court issued a preliminary in-
junction prohibiting enforcement of the tax, declaring it illegal and uncon-
stitutional. The lower court could find no express congressional authority
for the tax and determined that there was no inherent sovereign power in the
tribe to impose the tax. Furthermore, the trial court held that the tax was an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and that the tribal tax had
been preempted by an express congressional grant of authority to New Mex-
ico to impose severance taxes on oil and gas production within executive-
order reservations under provisions of section 398c of Title 25 of the United
States Code. 5
1. 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No.
80-1 1).
2. The tax is imposed at the time of severance, is payable monthly, and is assessed per
million Btu of natural gas and per barrel of crude oil taken off the reservation. Oil and gas used
as royalty payment to the tribe is exempt from the tax. Id. at 539.
3. Article XI, section l(e) provides:
Taxes and Fees. The tribal council may levy and collect taxes and fees on tribal
members, and may enact ordinances, subject to approval by the Secretary of the
Interior, to impose taxes, and fees on non-members of the tribe doing business on
the reservation.
(quoted in 617 F.2d at 539).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976) provides, in part:
Any Indian tribe or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to
organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and by-
laws, which shall become effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult mem-
bers of the tribe, or of the adult members residing on such reservation, as the case may
be, at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior under
such rules and regulations as he may prescribe,
5. 617 F.2d at 540. 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1976) provides:
Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon improvements,
output of mines or oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations in the same manner as such
taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes may be levied against the
share obtained for the Indians as bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized and directed to cause such taxes to be paid out of the tribal
[Vol. 58:2
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Upon the tribe's appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court, per Judge Lo-
gan, addressed the following three issues: 1) whether sovereign immunity
precluded suit against the tribe;6 2) whether the tribe possessed inherent
power to impose the severance tax; 7 and 3) whether the tax violated the
commerce clause. 8
The preliminary jurisdictional issue was discussed first. Noting that
sovereign immunity generally prevented suit against the Indian tribes absent
their consent, 9 the court of appeals found that the Jicarilla Apache tribe had
expressly waived its immunity in a provision of a recently passed tribal ordi-
nance. Under the 1934 Act, broad powers of self government were granted
to the tribes, powers broad enough to allow them to waive their immunity.
To deny the tribe this right of waiver would, the appellate court reasoned,
contradict both the terms and the intent of the 1934 Act. Moreover, the
court concluded that by approving the ordinance, the Secretary had ratified
the waiver provisions contained therein; therefore, the express waiver of im-
munity found in the tribal ordinance was valid.iO
After disposing of the jurisdictional question, the court of appeals ad-
dressed the crucial issue of the case-whether executive-order reservation
tribes possess z/hereni power to impose a mineral severance tax on non-Indi-
ans operating on reservation lands. The court stated that "the case . . .
presents the bald issue of an Indian tribe's taxing power without benefit of
reservations of authority in a treaty."' I
The Tenth Circuit court discussed the problems posed by the quasi-
sovereign status of the Indian tribes. Certain powers are denied to the tribes
because exercise of these powers would in some way infringe on the superior
rights of the United States. Thus, the Indian tribes have no right to inde-
pendently transfer land, 12 to deal with foreign nations,1 3 or to assert crimi-
nal jurisdiction over non-Indians.i4 The court of appeals, however, found
that the tribe's enactment of the mineral severance tax did not interfere with
any federal right. The federal taxing power remained unscathed since the
United States could "tax non-Indians or Indians within the reservation
whether or not the Tribe levies this tax. ' ' i 5 Neither did the tax violate the
protection afforded by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, because, ac-
cording to the court of appeals, the tax was not so severe as to constitute a
deprivation of property. 16
The remaining aspect of this issue, and the central one, was whether
funds in the Treasury: Providtd, That such taxes shall not become a lien or charge of
any kind against the land or other property of such Indians.
6. 617 F.2d at 540.
7. Id. at 541.
8. Id. at 544.
9. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
10. 617 F.2d at 540.
I1. Id. at 543.
12. Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
13. The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 9, 17-18 (1831).
14. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).




taxation is one of those inherent powers surrendered by Indian tribes when
they acquire their quasi-sovereign status. While recognizing that recent
Supreme Court decisions have limited the inherent powers of the tribes be-
cause of the current dependent status of Indians,t 7 the Tenth Circuit pointed
out that the test employed by the Supreme Court in making these deter-
minations was not based upon the degree of a tribe's dependency, but rather
the Court examined whether the exercise of a certain power by the tribes
would interfere with the sovereignty of the United States. If dependency
were the test, the court of appeals reasoned, then consistency would dictate
that the tribes exercise no powers over either non-members or members, ulti-
mately conditioning the very existence of the tribes upon congressional ap-
proval. This would reduce the tribes to private, voluntary associations, a
status expressly rejected by the Court in United States v. Mazurze.' 8
In finding that taxation is an inherent power retained by the Indian
tribes, the Tenth Circuit relied upon Supreme Court decisions which have
held that territoriality is one of the sovereign powers which the Indian tribes
have not surrendered. The court of appeals concluded that this fact justified
the imposition by the tribes of a tax on the extraction and removal of miner-
als by non-Indians from Indian territory.' 9
The court of appeals focused on section 16 of the 1934 Act, which sec-
tion recognized generally the sovereign powers of the tribes. Noting that
Congress was aware of the holding in Buster v. Wright,20 wherein the Court
had affirmed the right of the Creek Nation to impose a tax on non-Indians
doing business on its reservation, the Tenth Circuit found implicit congres-
sional approval of the Indian taxing power because no express provisions
limiting the taxing power had been included in the 1934 Act. 2t Further
support for this interpretation was found in an opinion by the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior, issued shortly after passage of the 1934 Act. Com-
17. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
18. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
19. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
20. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906). The court of appeals
had held:
The authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may
transact business within its borders did not have its origin in act of Congress, treaty, or
agreement of the United States. It was one of the inherent and essential attributes of
its original sovereignty. It was a natural right of that people, indispensable to its au-
tonomy as a distinct tribe or nation,. and it must remain an attribute of its government
until by the agreement of the nation itself or by the superior power of the republic it is
taken from it.
Id. at 950.
Other cases upholding the right of tribes to impose taxes on non-Indians doing business
within Indian reservations include Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (grazing tax);
Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 932 (1959) (non-
Indian cattle grazing lessee cannot raise constitutional claims of deprivation of property without
due process of law because Indian tribes are not states or other political subdivisions of the
United States); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 99 (8th Cir. 1956) ("Inasmuch as
it has never been taken from it, the defendant Oglala Sioux Tribe possesses the power of taxa-
tion [on the privilege of grazing livestock] which is an inherent power incident of its sover-
eignty.").
21. 617 F.2d at 544.
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menting on section 16, the Solicitor stated that "chief among the powers of
sovereignty recognized as pertaining to an Indian tribe is the power of taxa-
tion."' 2 2 The court of appeals reasoned that this contemporaneous interpre-
tation of the meaning of section 16, by the agency charged with its
enforcement, should be given great weight.
23
After finding that the tribe had an inherent power to tax mineral lessees
doing business on the tribe's reservation, the Tenth Circuit addressed the
trial court's finding that the tax violated the commerce clause. In rejecting
the trial court's conclusion that the tax was discriminatory because it did not
apply to oil and gas royalty production transferred to the tribe, the court of
appeals pointed out the purposeless and self-defeating nature of the imposi-
tion of a tribal tax on its own resources.24 In addition, the court found that
no burden was imposed upon interstate commerce by the severance tax per
se. In support of this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit noted a line of cases
which have held that a tax on local activity, levied before a product enters
the stream of interstate commerce, is not categorically subject to commerce
clause restrictions.
2 5
It was more difficult for the court of appeals to justify the tax as not
imposing a multiple burden on interstate commerce, since the State of New
Mexico also taxes the oil and gas produced on the Jicarilla reservation. The
court divided this issue into two questions: 1) whether New Mexico's tax
interfered with the United States interest in allowing the tribe to enact its
tax, and 2) whether Congress had preempted the tribe's power to tax oil and
gas lessees by expressly granting to the states the power to tax lessees on
executive-order reservations under section 398 of Title 25.26 It is significant
that the court of appeals declined to consider the first issue. Moreover, the
manner in which the question was phrased indicates that, if the issue is
raised in subsequent litigation, the appellate court may find that state sever-
ance taxes on minerals extracted from Indian lands are an unconstitutional
intrusion into the federal government's power to regulate Indian affairs.
27
22. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 46 (1934). See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
142 (1942), wherein the author states that "one of the powers essential to the maintenance of
any government is the power to levy taxes. That this power is an inherent attribute of tribal
sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress is a
proposition which has never been successfully disputed."
23. 617 F.2d at 544.
24. Id. at 545.
25. E.g., Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
26. 617 F.2d at 546.
27. For a discussion which concludes that states do not have the power to preempt Indian
mineral taxation, see Comment, The Case for Excluste Tribal Power to Tax Mineral Lessees of Indan
Lands, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1975). The author argues that state taxation of Indian reserva-
tion mineral lessees is invalid because: 1) it reduces the income to the tribe, thereby impairing
its ability to function as a governmental entity; and 2) it interferes illegally with the tribe's
sovereign right to impose taxes. Id. at 507. But see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336
U.S. 342 (1949), wherein the Court held that states could tax oil company income derived from
mineral production activities on reservation leaseholds, even though it might interfere with tri-
bal royalty payments. See also Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside,
306 F. Supp. 279 (CD. Cal. 1969), affd442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. detied, 405 U.S. 933
(1972), wherein a state possessory interest tax on non-Indians was upheld even though it im-
posed a burden on the tribe's only source of income.
19811
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Though recognizing the express language in section 398 authorizing
state taxation, 28 the court of appeals reasoned that, by not specifically
prohibiting Indian taxation of the minerals, Congress did not preempt the
power of executive-order Indian reservation tribes to enact severance taxes.
29
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court followed the well-settled
orinciole that statutes affecting Indians are to be construed so that ambigui-
ties are resolved in their favor.
30
The court of appeals inferred that because Congress failed either to ex-
plicitly permit or to prohibit the levying of Indian severance taxes, Congress
did not consider the issue at the time of the enactment of section 398. The
court also employed this reasoning to support its conclusion that the provi-
sion in section 398c, for royalty and bonus payments to Indians through the
leasing process, was not meant to preclude the enactment of a severance tax
by executive-order tribes. 3 ' The crucial part of the 1934 Act, according to
the majority, was the section allowing Indians to determine for themselves
what leasing regulations to enact. 32 The court noted that the Department of
the Interior had implemented this provision in its leasing regulations.
Two lengthy and vigorous dissents were filed by Chief Judge Seth and
Judge Barrett. Chief Judge Seth's analysis centered upon the particular his-
tory of the Jicarilla tribe and its nomadic nature. 33 Because of this, Chief
Judge Seth reasoned that the Jicarillas never exercised the territoriality
which he felt would have justified the imposition of the tax.34 He noted that
the historical sovereign in this geographic area was Mexico, which ceded the
territory to the United States in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Although the treaty provided for certain previously existing property rights,
the Jicarilla tribe was not mentioned among those with claims to the land.
Chief Judge Seth distinguished the nomadic Jicarilla tribe from the settled
Pueblo Indians and noted that the creation of the Jicarilla reservation by
executive order did not bestow any territorial rights upon the tribe. The
chief judge concluded that the tribe's property rights were no different from
28. See note 5 supra for the text of section 398c.
29. In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159 (1936),
the Court held that section 398c applied to unallotted tribal trust lands and that "Congress
assents to taxation by the State of the production of oil and gas through a lease given under
[section 398c's] provisions." Id. at 166. The Court, however, had determined earlier in the
decision that the reservation was of congressional origin, rather than a creature of executive
order. Since section 398c pertains specifically to executive-order reservations, the Court may
have misapplied the statute. In addition, the Brtish-Amercan Court did not reach the issue of
the exclusivity of the state tax.
30. E.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976) and Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248
U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).
31. 617 F.2d at 547-48.
32. 25 U.S.C. § 396b (1976) provides, in part:
[Tihe foregoing provisions shall in no manner restrict the right of tribes organized and
incorporated under sections 476 and 477 of this title, to lease lands for miningpurposes as
therein provided and in accordance with the provisions of any constitution and charter adopted by any
Indian tribe ....
(emphasis added).
33. 617 F.2d at 551 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
34. Id. But see the concurring opinion of Judge McKay, in which he states that the concept
of tribal sovereignty is not dependent on the exercise of territorial rights. Id.-at 549.
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those of any other socio-economic group 35 and, therefore, the 1934 Act did
not create a status in the tribe which had not existed previously. Although
conceding that the 1934 Act granted to the tribes power over the internal
and social relations of tribal members, such as criminal jurisdiction and in-
heritance distribution, Chief Judge Seth stated that these rights did not in-
clude the independent power to tax as a sovereign nation.
36
Judge Barrett, in his dissent, emphasized that the Jicarilla reservation
was created by executive order and that there were, therefore, no treaty
rights involved in the Jicarillas' attempt to exercise taxing powers. Judge
Barrett noted that past cases which upheld the power of the tribes to enact
taxes on non-Indian activities were based on specific grants in individual
treaties, statutes, or agreements. Since there had been no express grant of
taxation authority to the Jicarilla tribe, the judge argued that a "balancing
of interests" test had to be applied. 37 Judge Barrett then interpreted section
398c as demonstrating a clear congressional intent to reserve to state and
local governments the right to levy and collect taxes on production from oil
and gas wells within executive-order Indian reservations. 38
The Tenth Circuit decision in Merron v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe has the
potential of allowing any Indian tribe to enact severance taxes on mineral
production within reservations created by executive order or by treaty.
Since the Tenth Circuit court found sufficient legal justification for the im-
position of a severance tax by tribal governments on executive-order reserva-
tions, despite express statutory provisions granting to the states the power to
tax mineral production on these lands, there is little doubt that similar taxes
enacted by tribes living on treaty-created reservations, which reservations do
not have corresponding statutory provisions permitting state severance taxes,
will be upheld.
39
35. This statement appears to be at odds with the Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975), wherein the Court stated that "Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."
See also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) ("[Indian tribes are] a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)
("[T~he several Indian nations fare] distinct political communities, having territorial bounda-
ries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.").
36. 617 F.2d at 553-54.
37. Id. at 557-59 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
38. For a discussion of congressional history relative to section 398c, see Comment, The Case
for Exclusive Tribal Power to Tax Mineral Lessees ofIndan Lands, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 520 n. 175
(1975). See also Comment, Tribal Power to Tax Non-Indian Mineral Lessees, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J.
969, 989-90 (1979), which discusses the confusing congressional history of section 398. It is
interesting to note that the authors of these two comments come to completely opposite conclu-
sions regarding congressional intent over executive-order Indian reservation tribal power to tax
mineral lessees.
39. There are several current federal district court cases on this issue. However, the tribe
involved in these cases is a treaty reservation tribe--the Navajos. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. 79-0153 (D. Utah, filed Mar. 15, 1979); Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. 78-352 (D. Ariz.,
filed July 11, 1978).
See also Ames, Tribal Taxation of Non-Inditan Mineral Lessees.- An Undefmed Inherent Power, 6 J.
CONTEMP. L. 55 (1979). Ames argues that the power to tax mineral lessees on reservation land
is an inherent power of tribal sovereignty.
1981]
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The weakest part of the majority's opinion appears to be in its conclu-
sion that the express congressional grant of -authority to the states to tax
mineral production on executive-order reservations did not preempt tribal
taxation of the same production. 40 The Merrion decision places oil and gas
and other mineral lessees operating on Indian reservations in the economi-
cally disadvantageous position of paying severance taxes on the same min-
eral production to both the state and Indian governmental bodies. This
double taxation may become so onerous as to constitute either an unconsti-
tutional taking of property or an undue burden on interstate commerce.
A related, and as yet unanswered question, which will likely arise in
future litigation, is whether a stale severance tax on Indian reservation min-
erals is an unconstitutional intrusion on the powers of the federal govern-
ment. In the Merrion case, the federal government had specifically granted
to the states the authority to tax oil and gas production from the Jicarillas'
executive-order reservation. If a state were to tax mineral production from
Indian reservations created by treaty, in which case section 398 would not
apply, the state might be guilty of unduly burdening interstate commerce.
A challenge to the state's taxation would arise if the double taxation pro-
vided a stumbling block to the continued mining or drilling on Indian
lands.
4 '
B. Munict;ial Easement Condemnation of Indian Lands
In United States v. City of McAlester,42 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the United States was not a necessary party to the city's 1903 wa-
tershed basin easement condemnation of Choctaw and Chickasaw reserva-
tion lands. The court, however, remanded the case to the federal district
court for reconsideration of whether the city's present use of the easement
was consistent with watershed basin purposeS.
4 3
The City of McAlester had condemned 2,535.8 acres of Indian lands in
The doctrine of Indian sovereignty means little if a tribe has no revenues to carry out
its plans. This is especially true with the Navajo, whose population is undereducated
and underemployed .... If a tribe is to govern itself, it is essential that taxation be
one of the powers which is retained.
Id. at 64. This reasoning was adopted by Judge McKay in his concurring opinion. Judge Mc-
Kay asserted that "it simply does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry out municipal
functions approved and mandated by Congress without being able to exercise at least minimal
taxing powers, whether they take the form of real estate taxes, leasehold taxes or severance
taxes." 617 F.2d at 550 (McKay, J., concurring).
40. See note 38 supra.
41. The Solicitor of the Department of Interior recently issued an opinion concerning New
Mexico's taxation of the royalties accruing to the Jicarilla tribe from oil and gas production on
reservation land. The opinion states that § 398 prescribes that executive-order reservation
tribes are to be treated the same as treaty reservation tribes. Furthermore, he asserted that,
pursuant to an earlier opinion explaining that tribal royalties from oil and gas production on
treaty reservations in Montana could not be taxed by the state, "taxation of production on
Jicarilla Apache tribal lands from leases made under the 1938 Leasing Act is not authorized by
§ 398c. . . . Thus, New Mexico may not tax royalties received by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe
from 1938 Act leases." [19791 6 INDIAN L. RPTR. H-4. This opinion, however, was specifically
limited to Indian royalties and did not address New Mexico's right to impose severance taxes on
the lessees themselves.
42. 604 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1979).
43. Id. at 55.
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1903 for use as a "watershed and basin and [for] erecting, maintaining, and
using a waterworks system," without joining the United States in the con-
demnation proceeding.4 4 In 1950, the encumbered tribes filed a quiet title
suit against the city and moved to join the United States. The United States
was dismissed from the suit because it had not consented to be sued.
45 The
easement condemnation was subsequently ruled valid by the district court,
46
which held that the Tenth Circuit decision of Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v.
Sez'Iz 4 7 was controlling. In 1975, the United States brought a second quiet
title action on behalf of itself and as the trustee of Indian lands. The govern-
ment argued that because the United States was an indispensable party to
the original 1903 action, the city's failure to join the United States rendered
the 1903 condemnation decision invalid. The federal district court ruled
against the United States,
48 a three-judge Tenth Circuit panel reversed,
49
and, upon grant of a rehearing en banc, the panel decision was overturned.
50
The issues presented on appeal were: 1) whether the United States was
an indispensable party to the 1903 condemnation; 2) whether section 11 of
the Curtis Act authorized the condemnation; and 3) whether the city had
made improper use of the easement for non-watershed purposes.
5
1
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Non-Intercourse Act of
183452 prevented any conveyance of Indian land without the consent of the
United States.5 3 The court pointed out, however, that this restriction had
been significantly modified by subsequent legislation. Under provisions es-
tablished by the Dawes Commission of 1893,' 4 the United States gave its
broad consent to the alienation of Indian lands without requiring specific
prior approval by the federal government. Furthermore, section 11 of the
Curtis Act allowed incorporated cities adjacent to reservation lands to con-
demn "lands actually necessary for public improvements, regardless of tribal
lines."'55 Also, the Atoka Agreement of 1897, between the Dawes Commis-
sion and the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, which was incorporated as
section 29 of the Curtis Act, 56 gave United States consent for the tribes to
44. City of South McAlester v. Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, No. 3293 (C.D. Ind.
Terr. 1903).
45. 604 F.2d at 58.
46. Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v. City of McAlester, No. 2781-Civil (E.D. Okla.
Sept. 10, 1952).
47. 193 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 919 (1952).
48. United States v. City of McAlester, 410 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
49. The panel decision is reprinted at the conclusion of the en banc decision. 604 F.2d at 57.
Judges McWilliams and Doyle dissented from the majority opinion and continued to adhere to
the panel decision. See Overview, Lands and Natural Resources, Fifth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 56
DEN. L.J. 517, 524-26 (1979).
50. 604 F.2d at 55.
51. Id. at 45.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976) provides, in part:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution.
53. 604 F.2d at 47.
54. 27 Stat. 612, 645 (1893).
55. Curtis Act of 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, 498.




The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on section 2 of the Curtis
Act to justify its conclusion that the United States was not a necessary party
to the 1903 condemnation. 57 The majority of the court inferred that the
legislature's failure to expressly mandate the inclusion of the United States
as a necessary party demonstrated a congressional belief that the federal gov-
ernment was not an indispensable party in an action affecting tribal prop-
erty.5 8 The court concluded that the specific provisions of the Curtis Act,
permitting the alienation of Indian lands without joinder of the United
States, controlled over the more general provisions of the Non-Intercourse
Act.5 9
In rejecting the government's argument that the condemnation provi-
sions of section 11 pertained only to allotted lands, the court focused on the
express language of the Curtis Act, which granted condemnation authority
to "all towns and cities ... [and] all lands, regardless of tribal lines . . .,6
The court was satisfied that this language demonstrated that municipal con-
demnation actions are not limited to allotted lands. Although the condem-
nation provisions of section 11 deal principally with allotted lands, the court
pointed out that some of the section's provisions also refer to certain types of
unallotted lands. 6 ' The court concluded that although the provision for
condemnation proceedings had been included within section 11, Congress
did not intend thereby to limit condemnation actions to allotted lands.
62
The United States claim that Congress had breached its fiduciary duty
as trustee of Indian lands, by allowing condemnation of unallotted lands
without the government's prior, specific consent, was also rejected. The
court found the 1953 decision of Choctaw and Chickasaw Natlzns v. Atoka, 63 in
which the court had allowed the condemnation of unallotted Indian lands,
to be controlling on this point. Further support for the court's reasoning was
found in provisions of section 11, which established certain procedural re-
quirements for municipal condemnation actions, such as the guarantee of
the right to a jury trial and the designation of territorial federal district court
judges to preside over condemnation actions. These procedural safeguards
indicated, to the majority of the court, that the United States had not
breached its fiduciary duties. 64
Although the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, the
case was remanded for a further hearing on the issue of whether the city had
violated the purpose of the original easement. The city had leased some of
57. 604 F.2d at 49. Section 2 of the Curtis Act made Indian tribes necessary parties to any
action affecting tribal property. 30- Stat. 495 (1898).
58. 604 F.2d at 50.
59. Id. at 49.
60. 30 Stat. 498 (1898).
61. Id. at 497-498. Certain provisions of the Curtis Act reserved from allotment those
lands used for churches, schools, parsonages, charitable institutions, and burial grounds.
62. 604 F.2d at 50.
63. 207 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1953).
64. 604 F.2d at 51.
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the easement lands for private uses.65 The court noted that whether these
non-municipal activities were a departure from the necessary or incidental
purposes of the watershed easement was a question to be decided under
Oklahoma law.
66
Judges McWilliams, Doyle, and McKay subscribed to the earlier panel
decision. 6 7 The unanimous three-judge panel had held that whereas the
condemnation provisions in the Curtis Act appeared in section 11, and
whereas this section dealt exclusively with allotted lands, unallotted lands
were not included in those Indian lands subject to condemnation.
C. State Court Jurisdiction Over Indian Reserved Water Rights
The jurisdictional authority of state courts to determine the status of
Indian reserved water rights was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Jzcar'la Apache Tribe v. United States.68 In addition, the court con-
firmed the propriety of United States representation of Indian federal re-
served water rights interests in state water rights adjudications. The right of
a tribe to independently intervene to protect tribal water rights was also
advanced.
6 9
In an action filed in state district court, New Mexico sought a general
water rights adjudication of all the water rights and uses of the San Juan
River system.70 As the action involved the determination of federally re-
served water rights, including Indian reserved water rights, the United
States was joined as a defendant. The United States attempted to remove
the case to federal district court. Furthermore, the federal government
sought to dismiss that part of the suit designating the United States as the
fiduciary representative of all Indian reserved rights, claiming conflicts of
interest. 7 ' The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
remanded the case to the state district court for a determination of all water
rights claims, including the Indian claims. The federal district court man-
dated that the United States continue to represent Indian interests.
72
The Jicarilla Apache tribe subsequently filed suit in federal district
65. Id. at 52. These private uses included farming, hunting, fishing, grazing, and recrea-
tional uses.
66. Id. at 55. The court held that the test used by the trial court, i.e., whether the present
uses were inconsisient with the watershed easement, was improper. The appropriate test, under
Oklahoma law, was whether the uses were "incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper
enjoyment of the easement." Hudson v. Lee, 393 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Okla. 1964).
67. 604 F.2d at 57-64. The panel decision was authored by the honorable Howard T.
Markey, Chief Judge, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designa-
tion.
68. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 530 (1979). The McCarran Amend-
ment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976), in which the United States consented to joinder in any state
proceeding involving the general adjudication of water rights, provided the statutory basis for
the court's holding.
69. 601 F.2d at 1127.
70. Reynolds v. United States, No. 75-184 (Dist. Ct. San Juan County, filed Mar. 13,
1975).
71. 601 F.2d at 1118. The United States implied that whereas the Apaches, the Navajos,
and the Utes all had reserved water rights claims involved in the litigation, it could not ade-
quately represent each tribe's interest. Id. at 1120.
72. Id.
1981]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2
court, seeking both a general adjudication of water rights on the Navajo
River system and injunctive relief against the United States to protect the
tribe from an alleged violation of the Upper Colorado River Compact.
73
The tribe asserted that the United States diversion of water from the
Chama-Rio Grande River system through the San Juan-Chama Project ex-
ceeded the amount of water that could beneficially be used by the appro-
priating parties.
7 4
The State of New Mexico argued that the adjudication of all federally
reserved water rights should be conducted in one forum. The state also as-
serted that the United States was the real party in interest in any litigation
involving Indian reserved water rights. The federal district court suggested
to the tribe that a bifurcation of the reserved rights issue and the interstate
compact issue would facilitate a hearing on the transmountain diversion as-
pects of the case. The tribe rejected the court's suggestion. 75 The federal
district court then dismissed the entire case for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. 76
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the central issue before the court was
whether the McCarran Amendment 77 had effectively repealed the jurisdic-
tional disclaimer contained in the New Mexico Enabling Act 78 and in the
state constitution. 79 Through the language in section 2 of the New Mexico
Enabling Act, the people of New Mexico renounced the right to divest the
title to any property "held by any Indian or Indian tribes the right or title to
which shall have been acquired through or from the United States." 80 The
enabling act further provided that the disclaimer was irrevocable without
the consent of both the Congress and the people of New Mexico. 8t These
73. Id. at 1119.
74. Id. The appropriators had contracted with the Secretary of the Interior for said waters.
75. Id. at 1121.
76. Id. at 1123.
77. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976). The pertinent portion of the McCarran Amendment pro-
vides:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a water system or other source. . . .The
United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (I) be deemed to have waived any
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judg-
ments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.
Id.
78. New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 558-559. Section 2 of the
New Mexico Enabling Act provides, in part:
[Tihe people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated and ungranted public lands lying
within the boundaries thereof and to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or
held by any Indian or Indian tribes the right or title to which shall have been acquired
through or from the United States.
Id.
79. N.M. CONST. art. 21, § 2. The wording is similar to the language of the Enabling Act,
see note 78 supra.
80. 36 Stat. 558-559 (1910).
81. Id. The state relinquishment of authority over the public domain contained in the
New Mexico Enabling Act is consistent with similar disclaimers found in the enabling acts of
other public land states. L. MALL, PUBLIC LAND AND MINING LAW at 3-6 (1979).
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provisions were codified in the state constitution. 82
The Tenth Circuit court recognized the express wording of the enabling
act and the state constitution, but nevertheless concluded that there pres-
ently exists no exclusive federal jurisdiction over Indian water rights dis-
putes.8 3 The court of appeals relied upon the legislative history of the
McCarran Amendment, which the court felt demonstrated a congressional
determination that all federal water rights should be settled in one forum.
The Tenth Circuit court reasoned that the language of the McCarran
Amendment and the congressional rationale for its enactment pointed to-
ward an implicit modification of the New Mexico Enabling Act. 84 In addi-
tion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the decisions of New
4exico v. Aamodt85 and Colorado River Water Conservancy Di trct v. United
States86 were controlling. These earlier cases expressly held that state courts
have jurisdiction to determine Indian reserved water rights. The court also
found implicit support for its conclusion in United States v. District Court,8 7 a
case wherein the Supreme Court had spoken of non-Indian and Indian re-
served rights without any suggestion of a distinction between the two for
purposes of McCarran Amendment jurisdiction.
Together with its McCarran Amendment reasoning, the Tenth Circuit
court adjudged that whereas the disclaimer provisions in the New Mexico
Enabling Act pertained only to proprietary tterests in Indian lands, the en-
abling act's limitations did not apply to general water rights adjudications.
The court of appeals analogized this New Mexico case to the situation which
confronted the Supreme Court in Kake Village v. Egan.88 Kake Village arose
as the result of Alaska's attempt to regulate the fishing practices of Indians
residing in Alaskan incorporated communities. The Supreme Court ruled
that despite jurisdictional disclaimer provisions in the Alaska Enabling Act,
the state had authority to regulate Indian fishing activities.8 9 The Tenth
Circuit suggested, on the basis of Kake Village, that so long as state regulation
of Indian rights does not interfere with property rights granted to the Indi-
ans by the United States, or impair the ability of Indian tribes to govern
themselves, the state regulations will not constitute a breach of enabling act
restrictions. 9° As state adjudication of Indian reserved water rights was
deemed not to interfere with the Jicarilla Apache tribe's self-governance or
to impair a property right granted to the Indians by the United States, the
Tenth Circuit found that New Mexico jurisdiction attached. 9 1
82. N.M. CONsT. art. 21 § 2.
83. 601 F.2d at 1130.
84. Id. at 1131.
85. 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
86. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The Supreme Court declared that "the state court had jurisdic-
tion over Indian water rights under the [McCarran] Amendment." Id. at 809.
87. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
88. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
89. Id.
90. 601 F.2d at 1135.
91. Id. A third foundation for the court's holding was the basic principle that Congress
may delegate its supervisory authority over the Indian tribes. United States v. New Mexico, 590
F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 63 (1979). The court of appeals found that
the McCarran Amendment served as a specific congressional delegation ofjurisdictional author-
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The court of appeals' distinction between Indian proprietary rights, to
which the enabling act restrictions purportedly apply, and other Indian
property rights, is a sound one. Because Indian reserved water rights, as
Alaskan native fishing rights, fall into the latter category, state jurisdiction
over the Indian water rights would be appropriate even if the enabling act
was not modified by the McCarran Amendment. Rather than limiting itself
to this analysis, however, the court emphasized the modification of the en-
abling act by subsequent congressional actions and Supreme Court deci-
sions. The court never squarely addressed the tribe's contention that the
McCarran Amendment did not repeal the disclaimer of the enabling act.
92
The language of the enabling act and of the state constitution clearly pro-
vides that the state's relinquishment of jurisdiction over Indian property
rights can be reversed only with the consent of both the United States and the
people of New Mexico. 9 3 The court adduced no evidence of state approval
of the modification and, therefore, the court apparently assumed that Con-
gress may effectively alter the terms of state enabling acts and state constitu-
tions through unilateral action. That the result of the court of appeals'
decision in this case was to increase the authority of the New Mexico state
government does not minimize the significance of this declaration.
The ancillary issue of whether the federal government or the Indian
tribes are the appropriate defendants in Indian reserved water rights litiga-
tion also was addressed by the Tenth Circuit in jicarila Apache Tribe v. United
Stales.94 The court affirmed that "the United States is the proper party de-
fendant in any general water rights adjudication proceeding, whether
brought in federal court or state court, relating to federally created water
rights, including those reserved for use by Indian tribes."'9 5 The appellate
court noted, however, that this rule does not preclude the affected Indian
tribes from obtaining private counsel to guarantee against any possible con-
flict of interest. 96 Since the Jicarilla Apache tribe had pending water rights
claims against the United States, and as several Indian tribes were affected
by the New Mexico general water rights adjudication, this case provided a
good example of the need for this independent right of intervention.
D. Distributon of Appropriation Funds to Individual Tribal Members
In Whiskers v. United States,9 7 the central issue was whether the funding
and distribution schemes enacted by Congress, as compensation for lands
taken from the Southern Paiute Nation, created a trust to be administered
by the Secretary of the Interior. The case arose because Chloe Whiskers, a
member of the Southern Paiute tribe potentially eligible to receive benefits
under the distribution scheme, failed to register for her share of the funds
ity to New Mexico. 601 F.2d at 1135. This analysis, however, begs the question of whether New
Mexico had accepted this delegation of authority.
92. 601 F.2d at 1130.
93. Id. at 1128.
94. Id. at 1127.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1028 (1980).
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within the period prescribed by the Secretary. 98 When her delayed request
for funds was denied, Chloe Whiskers brought an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, seeking damages against the United
States. Whiskers alleged breach of trust and statutory duties and claimed an
unconstitutional taking of her property. 99
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the dis-
trict court, held that the Southern Paiute Judgment Distribution Act (the
Distribution Act)' 0 0 neither expressly nor implicitly created a trust relation-
ship between the Secretary and potential recipients of the benefits.' 0 Al-
though the court concurred with Whiskers' contention that, absent clear
congressional intent to the contrary, a trust relationship is created when the
word "trust" is used in an appropriations statute, the appellate tribunal
found that neither the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act (the Ap-
propriations Act)' 0 2 nor the Distribution Act mentioned the creation of a
trust. Congress nowhere stated that the Southern Paiute funds created by
these acts should be held in trust pending distribution of the funds. The
Distribution Act instructed the Secretary to establish procedures by which
the department could determine those persons eligible for the payments. In
failing to meet the enrollment deadline promulgated by the Secretary,
Whiskers and all other Indians in her position were precluded from fund
distribution.
The principle argument urged by Whiskers was that section 725s of Ti-
tle 31 mandates that funds appearing on government records, including In-
dian monies, are to be classified by the Treasury Department as trust
funds.10 3 The court of appeals acknowledged that the statutory language
appeared to include those funds appropriated by Congress for the Paiutes.
The court asserted, however, that a closer analysis of the statute revealed
that the funds referred to in section 725s were limited to a narrow category
of monies set aside for Indians. The appeals court declared that only income
resulting from the leasing of certain Indian lands originally reserved for
agencies and schools was to be included in the section 725s trust funds.
10 4
The trust monies are to be spent by Indian schools and agencies. The Ap-
propriation and Distribution Acts' grant to the Southern Paiute Nation, as a
fund appropriated in settlement of Indian claims, was deemed not to fall
within the narrow category of trust funds described in section 725s.105
The relationship between the United States government and the Indian
tribes may be characterized as a fiduciary one. The court of appeals found,
98. Id. at 1334.
99. Id.
100. Pub. L. No. 90-584, 82 Stat. 1147 (1968) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976)).
101. 600 F.2d at 1339.
102. Pub. L. No. 89-16, tit. iv, 79 Stat. 108 (1965).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 725s(a)(20) (1976) provides:
(a) The funds appearing on the books of the Government . . . shall be classified on
the books of the Treasury as trust funds .... [including]
(20) Indian moneys, proceeds of labor, agencies, schools, and so forth (5t301).
104. 600 F.2d at 1336, citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8242 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Griffin) and Hear-
ing on H.R. 9410 before the Subcommittee on Permanent Appropriations of the House Appro-
priations Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 255, 258 (1934).
105. 600 F.2d at 1336-37.
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nevertheless, that the test enunciated in United States v. Testan,10 6 requiring
an allegation of substantive statutory violations in actions against the United
States, had not been met by Whiskers' claim of a fiduciary breach. In Tes-
tan, the Supreme Court had concluded that the Tucker Act,' 0 7 the statute
under which Whiskers had claimed standing to bring the damages suit, was
not of itself a grant of jurisdiction. Claims under the Tucker Act must be
supported by a chargc that a specific federa statute, affording compensation
by the United States for damages sustained, pertains to the case. 108 As the
Tenth Circuit court could find no statutory, regulatory, or constitutional im-
propriety in the Secretary's failure to hold Whiskers' funds in trust, the court
concluded that there could be no violation of a substantive right, and that
certainly there was no specific congressional mandate to compensate persons
in Whiskers' situation.
Whiskers also had argued that the express language in Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribes v. United States10 9 mandated the classification of all judgments of the
Indian Claims Commission, under which the Appropriation Act and the
Distribution Act had been legislated, as trust funds. The court of appeals
distinguished the Cheyenne-Arapaho decision on the basis that "specific con-
gressional legislation had declared the funds in Cheyenne-A rapaho to be held in
trust."'O The court noted that there was no similar language in the acts
relied upon by Whiskers. The court of appeals summarily disposed of
Whiskers' fifth amendment taking claim, reasoning that since the Distribu-
tion Act provided for group claims, as opposed to providing individual prop-
erty rights, Whiskers "had no constitutionally recognizable . . . property
rights in the undistributed fund of which [she] could have been deprived in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.""'
By strictly construing the Appropriation and Distribution Acts, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated an unwillingness to infer a trust
relationship between Indian tribal members and the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, even where the Secretary is charged with distributing compensation
funds granted by the Indian Claims Commission and subsequently approved
by Congress. If individual tribal members are to preserve the right to com-
pensation awards, even in the face of the Secretary's improper administra-
tion of the tribal funds, specific language decreeing the creation of a trust
relationship must be included by Congress in the appropriations acts. With-
out specific statutory language, applicants qualified for federal compensa-
tion who do not strictly adhere to procedures established by the Secretary
will be precluded from subsequent damage claims against the United States.
E. Anti-Ahienation Clause of the General Allotment Act
Whether the anti-alienation clause of the General Allotment Act (Act)
106. 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976).
108. 424 U.S. at 398.
109. 512 F.2d 1390, 1392 (Ct. C1. 1975).
110. 600 F.2d at 1337.
111. 600 F.2d at 1338-39.
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runs with the land or is limited to the original allottee was the issue which
confronted the Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. United
States.' 1 2 The court of appeals held that alienation restrictions on allotted
land run with the land and are not personal to the individual allottee.
113
William Robedeaux, an Otoe Indian, was granted an allotment of Otoe
reservation land under the General Allotment Act of 1907. He subsequently
conveyed his allotted land, by deed, in 1950, to his son Willis. Willis entered
into an agreement with the Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company to ex-
change the allotted land for other land. The exchange was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. Allotted land is held in trust by the United States
and is not subject to encumbrances by creditors for debts incurred by the
allottee prior to issuance of the final patent. 14 Red Rock Co-op, a judg-
ment creditor of Willis, asserted a lien on the proceeds of the condemnation
of the land and objected to the transfer agreement entered into by Willis as
interfering with Red Rock Co-op's rights as a judgment creditor."15
The Tenth Circuit, in upholding Willis' right to exchange the allotted
land, noted that although Willis was technically a grantee rather than an
heir, he was, for practical purposes, an heir to his father's allotted land and
as such subject to the same restrictions. The appellate court relied upon the
holding of Stevens v. Commissioner," 6 a case wherein the Ninth Circuit had
concluded that the Indian lands tax exemption applied to allotted land
purchased by another Indian. The Ninth Circuit had noted the federal pol-
icy of encouraging the consolidation of larger blocks of land by Indians for
purposes of economic viability. Because the protective provisions in the Act
applied to the Indian transferee of allotted lands in Stevens, even though the
transferee was not an heir, the Tenth Circuit court reasoned that it was con-
gressional policy to extend the Act's anti-alienation provisions to grantees as
well as to heirs. Therefore, judgment creditors such as Red Rock Co-op can-
not assert liens on transferred allotted lands prior to patent.
F. Indian Trust Lands Included in the Term 'Indian Country"
The issue facing the appellate court in Chqenne-Arapaho Tribes v.
Oklahoma' t7 was whether the Assimilative Crimes Act"" granted jurisdic-
tion to the states to impose state hunting and fishing laws on lands held in
trust by the federal government for Indians. The Cheyenne-Arapaho reser-
vation was created by two treaties 1i9 and clarified by an executive order in
1869.120 Hunting and fishing rights were not discussed in the text of the
112. 609 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1979).
113. Id. at 1367.
114. 25 U.S.C. § 354 (1976).
115. 609 F.2d at 1366.
116. 452 F.2d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1971).
117. 618 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980).
118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1165 (1976).
119. Treaty with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, 14 Stat. 703 (1865); Treaty with the Chey-
enne Indians, 15 Stat. 593 (1867).
120. 618 F.2d at 666.
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treaties or in the executive order. Under the General Allotment Act,'12 the
President was authorized to allot portions of Indian reservations to individ-
ual tribal members and to sell the excess to private parties. The Cheyenne-
Arapahoe reservation was subsequently disestablished.
122
Oklahoma apparently had been exercising jurisdiction over the trust
lands within the disestablished reservation.1 23 The Cheyenne-Arapaho tribe
brought an injunctive action seeking to halt this practice. Since Indian
hunting and fishing rights within "Indian Country"' 124 are determined
under exclusive tribal jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether
trust lands within a disestablished reservation are included in the definition
of the term "Indian Country," thereby rendering them immune from state
hunting and fishing regulations.
The Tenth Circuit court relied principally on the recent decision in
United States v. John,125 wherein the Supreme Court held that criminal juris-
diction over Indian trust lands was vested exclusively in the United States.
The court of appeals also noted that a 1945 Solicitor's Opinion had stated
that lands acquired in trust for the Cheyenne-Arapaho tribe were classified
as reservation lands.' 2 6 Based on the Supreme Court's opinion in John, and
on the 1945 Solicitor's Opinion, the Tenth Circuit court found that the
Cheyenne-Arapaho trust lands should be considered "Indian Country."'
127
Oklahoma therefore had no authority to regulate Indian hunting and fishing
activities on trust lands.
The court of appeals rejected Oklahoma's argument that the Assimila-
tive Crimes Act gave the state jurisdiction over hunting and fishing activi-
ties, asserting that the Act did not incorporate state criminal statutes which
are inconsistent with federal policies. Particular reliance was placed on the
Act's section 1162(b), 128 which specifically guarantees Indian hunting and
121. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amendedby Act of May 8, 1806, ch. 2348, 34
Stat. 182.
122. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, which ratified an earlier agreement between
the United States and the tribes, and which provided:
The said Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes of Indians hereby cede, convey, transfer, relin-
quish, and surrender forever and absolutely, without any reservation whatever, express
or implied, all their claim, title, and interest of every kind and character, in and to the
lands [established by the executive order].
26 Stat. 1022. The Act also provided that the lands were to be held in trust by the United
States. 26 Stat. 1024.
123. In Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 252 (10th Cir. 1965), the court had held that the cumu-
lative effects of the several acts disestablished the reservation. The lands within the disestab-
lished reservation were classified into three categories: 1) individual allotments, 2) trust lands,
and 3) non-Indian lands. In the 1980 case, the Tenth Circuit was concerned with the second
category.
124. The term "Indian Country" is defined, in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976), as comprising all
Indian reservation land, including patented and easement lands, "all dependent Indian Com-
munities," and all Indian allotments with restrictions against alienation still in effect.
125. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
126. 59 Interior Dec. 1 (1945).
127. 618 F.2d at 667-68.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1976) provides, in part:
Nothing in this section ... shall deprive any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or commu-
nity of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or
statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing,-r regula-
tion thereof.
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fishing rights on trust lands. The appellate court agreed with the United
States argument that it would be inconsistent for Congress to have prohib-
ited state control of Indian hunting and fishing rights in section 1162(b), and
then to have given this authority back, indirectly, through other, less explicit
language in the Act.
1 29
II. NATURAL GAS SALES CONTRACTS
A. Interpretation of Favored Nations Clauses
In Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 130 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was asked to settle a contract dispute between the buyer and seller
of natural gas. The contract, delineating the conditions of the intrastate sale
of natural gas, included a favored nations clause requiring the buyer to pay
to the seller a purchase price equal to the highest price paid to any other
seller within a specific geographic area. The natural gas sales contract also
included a savings clause, whereby the buyer's obligation to pay the higher
price was made subject to several factors, including the quality of the gas,
the bases of measurement, delivery pressure, and "other conditions of sale."
When challenged by seller's claim that buyer was paying a higher price to
certain other sellers in contravention of the favored nations clause, buyer
defended by noting that the higher prices were being paid as a result of a
Federal Power Commission (FPC) "vintaging" order. 13' The buyer asserted
that vintaging, as one of the "other conditions of sale" contemplated by the
contracting parties as an exception to the favored nations clause, should not
be a factor in determining the price paid to seller. The Tenth Circuit, over-
ruling the district court, found that the phrase "other conditions of sale" did
not include vintaging,132 and hence the FPC's order did not protect buyer
from paying higher prices to seller when buyer paid higher prices to local
sellers subject to the FPC's jurisdiction.
133
Superior Oil, a natural gas production company, had entered, in 1964,
into a 20-year natural gas contract with Western Slope. The contract con-
tained a favored nations clause, which stated that Western Slope would pay
Superior a rate equal to the price that Western Slope paid other natural gas
suppliers within a three-county area of Colorado, if that price was higher
than that being paid Superior.' 34 In 1972, Western Slope notified Superior
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976).
129. 618 F.2d at 669.
130. 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979).
131. "Vintaging" refers to the date when a successful well is drilled, with gas from older
wells being priced lower than gas from recently drilled wells. 604 F.2d at 1284.
132. 604 F.2d at 1291.
133. Most of the regulatory responsibilities of the now defunct Federal Power Commission
have been assumed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The federal regulatory
agencies have authority over natural gas which is to be sold interstate.
134. Article 8.4 of the contract provides, in part:
If, at any time during the term of this Agreement, Buyer pays to a producer of natural
gas in Mesa, Garfield, and Rio Blanco County, Colorado, for the purpose of reselling
such gas in its Colorado market area, a price per MCF higher than that being paid to
Seller hereunder, due consideration being given to the quality of the gas, bases of
measurement, delivery pressure, and other conditions of salte, Buyer shall, commencing
upon the date of the first delivery of such natural gas at such higher price, and contin-
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Oil that it was paying a higher rate to other suppliers in the vicinity under
an FPC order and explained that it would begin paying Superior Oil at an
equal rate, even though the FPC order applied only to natural gas contracts
instituted on or after June 17, 1970.135 In 1974, Western Slope informed
Superior Oil that the favored nations clause was being triggered again, this
time as a result of Western Slope's contract with a supplier of gas from wells
drilled on or after January i, i973.1 36 In 1975, however, Superior Oil dis-
covered that Western Slope was paying a higher price to yet another sup-
plier in the three-county area-fifty cents per mcf compared with forty-five
cents per mcf paid to Superior Oil. Superior Oil notified Western Slope that
the buyer was violating the favored nations clause. Western Slope replied
that it had been advised that the vintaging concept established by the FPC
was included in the phrase "other conditions of sale" in the favored nations
clause of the 1964 agreement and that, under the vintaging scheme, Superior
Oil was receiving a fair rate. Superior Oil reminded Western Slope that a
triggering of the favored nations clause had occurred under previous FPC
orders, which included vintaging schedules. Superior Oil noted that West-
ern Slope's position was inconsistent with its past practice. When Western
Slope refused to increase the price paid to Superior Oil, the seller filed a
complaint against Western Slope, alleging buyer's failure to pay the full con-
tract price. '
37
The Tenth Circuit attempted to discern what the intent of the con-
tracting parties was at the time of the agreement's negotiation in 1964. In so
doing, the court of appeals found that the intrastate utilization clause of the
contract demonstrated that both Superior Oil and Western Slope intended
that their contract should not come under FPC jurisdiction.' 38 The court
examined Western Slope's pre-1975 actions regarding the favored nations
clause. By increasing the rate paid to Superior Oil without regard to the
FPC's vintaging schedule in effect during the earlier period, the court felt
that Western Slope indicated that it did not consider vintaging to be in-
cluded in the term "other conditions of sale."'
39
Western Slope had relied primarily on the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Pure Ol v. FPC14° to support its position that all factors, including vintaging,
uing so long as such higher price is paid for such gas, increase the price being paid to
Seller hereunder to equal such higher prices.
604 F.2d at 1282 (emphasis supplied by the court).
135. 604 F.2d at 1283.
136. Id. at 1283-84.
137. Id. at 1284-85.
138. Article 7.1 of the contract provides, in part:
Buyer represents that it is engaged solely in intrastate transportation of natural gas
within the State of Colorado and represents that gas purchased hereunder shall be sold
and used only in connection therewith. In the event Buyer should, at any time, pro-
pose to sell or use gas purchased hereunder in such manner that. . . will subject Seller
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission or any successor body . .. .
Buyer shall notify Seller at least ninety (90) days before such resale or other disposition
is commenced and Seller shall have the right hereunder, upon thirty (30) days' notice
to Buyer to terminate this agreement.
Id. at 1283.
139. 604 F.2d at 1289.
140. 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962).
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were included in the clause. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the Pure Oil
decision and agreed that peaking capacity was included in the savings
clause; peaking capacity, however, is a physical characteristic of natural gas
while there is no physical difference between "old" and "new" gas.14 1 The
court of appeals also distinguished the Pure Oil decision on the basis that the
contract in that case involved interstate gas and as such it was subject to
Commission regulations. The court noted that the contract in the instant
controversy concerned the intrastate sale of natural gas.
142
The court of appeals concluded that since vintaging was not contem-
plated by the parties as one of the "other conditions of sale" restricting the
favored nations clause, vintaging could not relieve Western Slope of its duty
to pay the higher price to Superior Oil. 143 Judge Barrett, in a concurring
opinion, stated that favored nations clauses should be declared void as
against public policy. 144 The concurrence urged the district court to con-
sider this issue on remand.
B. Restrzitions on Interstate Contract Termination Under Section 7(b) of the
Natural Gas Act
The higher prices available in intrastate markets for natural gas per-
suaded two oil and gas producers to attempt termination of interstate gas
purchase agreements. In both of these cases, the Tenth Circuit court found
that the attempted terminations were invalid because the wells, from which
the oil and gas flowed, previously had been dedicated to interstate markets
under Federal Power Commission (Commission) public convenience and ne-
cessity certificates. The wells had not been abandoned formally under the
Commission's administrative procedures. These Tenth Circuit decisions re-
flect the trend in recent Supreme Court opinions. The Court has sought to
restrict the ability of producers to discontinue unilaterally interstate distrib-
utor contracts. Absent Commission approval, gas from wells dedicated to
interstate markets cannot be diverted to intrastate markets.' 45 Lease expira-
tion or non-use of the wells do not obviate the necessity for formal abandon-
ment proceedings.
The issue of interstate abandonment through lease expiration arose in
Amarex, Inc. v. FERC.146 In 1970, Amarex had succeeded, by assignment, to
a leasehold interest in an Oklahoma oil and gas field. The lease, by its terms,
was to expire in 1972. After acquiring the leasehold, but prior to 1972,
Amarex entered into a gas purchase contract with Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Company (Arkla) whereby Arkla agreed to purchase the gas produced from
141. 604 F.2d at 1290-91.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1291.
144. Id. at 1291-97 (Barrett, J., concurring).
145. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979); California v. Southland
Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978); Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 170 (1960); Sunray Mid-
Continent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
360 U.S. 378 (1959). See aLo Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 556 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1977).
146. 603 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. deneid, 100 S. Ct. 1067 (1980). The regulatory re-




"all wells now or hereafter completed" on the lands covered by the
Oklahoma lease. 14 7 The contract included the gas produced from the quar-
ter section, which gas became the subject of the dispute. After entering the
contract, Amarex filed a petition with the Commission seeking a "small pro-
ducer" certificate of convenience and necessity, which was granted in 1971.
The effectiveness of the certificate was for an unlimited duration.
Amarex began natural gas deliveries to Arkla in 1971, although the gas
delivered was not from the Oklahoma leasehold. Upon expiration of the
Oklahoma leasehold in 1972, Amarex entered into another lease agreement
with the fee owner for a term of five years. A gas well had been drilled, and
there was production from the leasehold, but Amarex refused to deliver the
leasehold's gas to Arkla. After both parties filed petitions with the Commis-
sion, the federal agency directed Amarex to deliver the natural gas to
Arkla. 148
The issue presented to the court of appeals was whether Amarex's certif-
icate of public convenience and necessity, together with its contract with
Arkla, required it to deliver natural gas produced from the Oklahoma lease.
Amarex asserted that because the lease had been renewed subsequent to
both the distribution contract and the certificate's issuance, and since gas
had not been actually produced until 1975, Amarex was relieved of any duty
to deliver the gas to Arkla. The Tenth Circuit, in concluding that the gas
produced on the leasehold was dedicated to the interstate market, relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Califomi'a o. Southland Royalty
Co. 149 In Southland, the fee owner of certain Texas acreage had entered into
a fifty year lease with lessee, Gulf Oil Corporation. Gulf subsequently con-
tracted to sell gas interstate and obtained a certificate of public convenience
and necessity from the Commission to facilitate its interstate sales. Prior to
the expiration of Gulf's lease, Southland Royalty Company obtained fee title
to the acreage. Upon the expiration of the original fifty year lease in 1975,
the remaining oil and gas reserves automatically reverted to Southland.
Southland contracted to sell the gas intrastate; the Commission prevented
delivery because Southland had not petitioned for a ruling of "abandon-
ment" pursuant to the procedure established in Section 7(b) of the Natural
Gas Act. 150 Since the original certificate was of unlimited duration, South-
land was ordered to continue delivery to the interstate distributor. The
Court asserted that the fact that the original lessee no longer had an interest
in the land did not alter the circumstance that the wells had been dedicated
to interstate service.1
51
147. Id. at 128.
148. Id. at 129.
149. 436 U.S. 519 (1978).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976) provides:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities,
without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after
due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas
is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the
present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.
151. 436 U.S. at 525.
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Although acknowledging that the question in Southland was not pre-
cisely the one presented in Amarex, the court of appeals stated that the
Supreme Court's holding in Southland was dispositive of the instant case.
Once a natural gas field has been dedicated to interstate commerce pursuant
to issuance, by the Commission, of a certificate of convenience and necessity,
all gas in the field is subject to the certificate and gas produced from these
fields cannot be diverted to intrastate sale without compliance with the stat-
utorily mandated abandonment procedures.' 5 2 The Tenth Circuit ruled
that because Amarex had dedicated the Oklahoma gas to interstate com-
merce pursuant to a certificate granted by the Commission, all gas produced
on the leased lands should be delivered to Arkla absent a Commission deter-
mination of abandonment. The court noted that it was irrelevant that the
original lease had expired before production on the leased lands began.
153
Another aspect of the abandonment issue was decided on the same day
in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.' 54 In this case, the
dispute centered upon leases originally held by Shell Oil Company, Texas
Oil's predecessor. The leases of Oklahoma oil and gas lands were the basis
for a gas purchase agreement between Shell and Michigan Wisconsin,
whereby Shell committed all natural gas produced from the leased lands to
interstate sale. When a successful well was drilled in 1962, Shell began deliv-
ery of all of the natural gas produced to Michigan Wisconsin, pursuant to a
certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Commission.155 Texas
Oil meanwhile had begun production within the same unitized tract and
had entered into an intrastate contract for the delivery of gas to an
Oklahoma distributor. Shell abandoned and plugged its well in 1969 with
the permission of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.'
56
Obtaining Shell's interest in the lease at issue, Texas Oil instituted a
declaratory judgment action in federal district court to quiet title against
Michigan Wisconsin's contractual claim to the gas and for a determination
that the gas produced from the lease was not dedicated to interstate com-
merce. 157 The district court, in quieting title to the gas in Texas Oil, ruled
that the Commission had no primary jurisdiction to determine the abandon-
ment issue and that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's permission to
abandon was sufficient to terminate the interstate dedication. 158
152. See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979). In McCombs, the
Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision which had held that a gas field, from which
there had been no production for several years, and on which a new deeper well had been
drilled so as to produce gas, had been abandoned in fact although no formal abandonment
procedure had been instituted. McCombs v. FERC, 570 F.2d 1376 (1978); see Overview, Lands
and Natural Resources, Fifth Annual Tenth Circua Sume, 56 DEN. L.J. 517, 531 (1979). The
Supreme Court declared that there could be no abandonment of a natural gas field dedicated to
interstate commerce absent a finding of abandonment, by the Commission, following a § 7(b)
hearing. 442 U.S. at 543.
153. 603 F.2d at 131. Judge Barrett, in concurrence, maintained that the Southland decision
cannot be broadened to include dedications beyond those lands included in oil and gas leases
from which production was in fact realized. 1d. at 132.
154. 601 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1979).






The Tenth Circuit, reversing the district court's holding, found that the
Commission had primary jurisdiction to determine the question of the aban-
donment of gas wells dedicated to interstate markets. The district court had
relied erroneously on the Tenth Circuit's earlier decision in Wessely Energy
Corp. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. 159 as dispositive of the primary jurisdiction
issue. The court of appeals, however, distinguished the Wessel case from the
Texas Oil and Amarex situations because in Wessely, although a predecessor
lessee had entered a contract for the sale of natural gas interstate, no natural
gas was ever produced during the time of the lease. When the second lessee
entered into a gas purchase contract with an intrastate distributor, the Wes-
seoy court determined that the second lessee was not bound by the previous
lessee's contract with the interstate distributor. 160 Conversely, in the instant
case, gas had been produced and was distributed in interstate commerce for
seven years before Shell's well was shut down. 16 ' Following the Supreme
Court's Southland rationale, the Tenth Circuit held that once gas is produced
from a lease pursuant to a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by
the Commission, and once the gas begins to flow in interstate commerce, all
of the gas produced from the lease is dedicated to interstate commerce and
cannot be terminated absent Commission approval. 162
III. PUBLIC LANDS
A. Mineral Title Questions
In Amoco Production Co. v. United States, 163 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was asked to determine the timeliness of a quiet title action filed
against the United States.' 64 The court was called upon to interpret the
constructive notice provision of a statute authorizing suit against the United
States if filed within twelve years of the plaintiffs actual or constructive
knowledge of an adverse title claim of the federal government. 165 The court
of appeals determined that a quitclaim deed which did not appear in the
grantor-grantee chain of title but which was recorded in the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) tract index did not constitute constructive notice to a
subsequent grantee so as to commence the running of the statute of limita-
tions. 166
159. 593 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 920. The Wessey court held that "with no drilling, no production, no facilities,
there was no introduction of gas into the interstate market or any market. The Natural Gas Act
was never applicable to the tract." Id.
161. 601 F.2d at 1146.
162. See 436 U.S. 519, 527-28 (1978).
163. 619 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980).
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1976) provides, in part:
The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this
section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States
claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (1976) provides:
Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within
twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have
accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have
known of the claim of the United States.
166. 619 F.2d at 1392.
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In 1942, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation (FFMC) conveyed a
fee interest in the disputed Utah land to the Newton family. The conflict
arose over the grantor's subsequent conveyance of one-half of the mineral
interest in the Newton tract to the United States by quitclaim deed in 1957.
Amoco, the lessee of the Newton family company which claimed fee title,
sued the United States to quiet title to its mineral interests. The United
States defended, claiming that the action was barred by the twelve year stat-
ute of limitations. When the district court ruled that the action was timely,
the United States sought to introduce evidence challenging the validity of
the Newton's 1942 deed. The district court excluded all of the United
States' proffered evidence and granted summary judgment for Amoco.'
67
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion
that it was unreasonable to assume that Amoco had constructive notice of a
stray deed.'68 The court of appeals emphasized that whereas Utah law was
ambiguous and inconclusive on the issue of constructive notice, the federal
courts could not assume that Amoco "should have known" of the 1957
FFMC mineral conveyance to the United States.169 The appellate court did
overturn the district court's grant of summary judgment, however, asserting
that the exclusion of all of the evidence tendered by the United States was
error. The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial court had misinterpreted sev-
eral rules of evidence.17
0
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was afforded a further opportunity
to delineate the parameters of constructive notice to grantees of interests in
the public lands in Winkier v. Andos. 17' The case involved a challenge to the
rights of an assignee of a second priority drawee of a noncompetitive federal
oil and gas lease by the first drawee who had contested successfully the De-
partment of Interior's invalidation of his right to the oil and gas lease. Al-
though the court of appeals remanded the case for further deliberations at
the district court level, it outlined the various factors to be considered in
determining whether a lessee is a bona fide purchaser and, as such, is pro-
tected from administrative errors made by Interior in granting the lease.
The case arose from Winkler's efforts to obtain an oil and gas lease to
which the Tenth Circuit previously had declared he was entitled.' 72 Win-
167. Id. at 1387.
168. Id. at 1389.
169. Id. at 1388.
170. The trial court had not allowed the BLM file copy of the recorded deed into evidence,
basing its decision on FED. R. EVID. 1005 which provides that a certified, recorded copy of a
deed appearing in the county recorder's office and received into evidence precludes acceptance
of any other evidence. The Tenth Circuit, after quoting from the notes of the Advisory Com-
mittee relative to rule 1005, found that the rule applied to "the actual record maintained by the
public office . . . , not the original deed from which the record is made." 619 F.2d at 1390.
Since the contents of the original deed were at the crux of the controversy, FED. R. EvID.
1004(1), "which authorizes the admission of other evidence of the contents of a writing if all
originals are lost or destroyed, rather than Rule 1005, is applicable to the 1942 deed." Id. The
court also applied FED. R. EVID. 406, which allows introduction of the routine practice of an
organization, in finding that the conformed copy of the deed from the BLM files was properly
introduced and should have been received into evidence, assuming that the United States could
obtain proper authentication from the BLM office under FED. R. EviD. 901 and 902.
171. 614 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1980).
172. Id. at 708-709.
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kler had been the first drawee for a noncompetitive oil and gas lease on
certain Wyoming acreage; the Department nevertheless rejected his entry
card because of a name insufficiency. 173 Although the Tenth Circuit ulti-
mately vindicated Winkler's right to the lease, the second drawee had been
given the lease in the interim. The second drawee assigned her rights to the
Davis Oil Company.1
7 4
After the initial rejection of Winkler's application by the Wyoming
State Office of the BLM, he appealed, unsuccessfully, to the Interior Board
of Land Appeals (IBLA).1 75 Although Winkler sought relief in federal dis-
trict court, he did not request a preliminary injunction or a temporary re-
straining order to stay the issuance of the lease. Winkler failed to file a lis
pendens on the subject lease as required under section 1964 of Title 28.176
Consequently, no actual or constructive notice was provided to the second
drawee or to her assignee, Davis Oil Company, under Wyoming law.
Davis Oil, however, failed to search BLM records to assure itself that
there was no claimed adverse interest, relying on issuance of the lease by the
BLM as sufficient assurance that the award was not contested. By the time
Davis Oil filed notice of the assignment in the BLM office, the office had
received notice of Winkler's federal court action, and, as a result, the BLM
delayed approval of the assignment. Two years later, in 1977, the BLM in-
formed Davis Oil of the court action, but rather than wait until the Tenth
Circuit had rendered an opinion, the BLM approved the assignment. At all
times after this BLM approval of the assignment, Davis Oil had actual no-
tice of Winkler's court action.
177
The Tenth Circuit noted that the bona fide purchaser provision of the
Mineral Leasing Act' 78 and the holding in Southwestern Petroleum Corp. v.
Udall ' 79 demonstrated that the time of bona fide purchaser determination is
the date of the assignment, not the date of BLM approval of a transfer of
173. The BLM initially rejected Winkler's entry card because he had stamped "F.A. Win-
kler Agency" on one side, implying that the card was endorsed by a corporation. A corporation
is required to provide supplemental information not supplied by Winkler. 43 C.F.R. § 3112.2-
1 (a) (1979). See Winkler v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1979). Seealso Overview, Admibstra-
tie Law, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 131 (1980).
174. 614 F.2d at 709.
175. The issuance of the oil and gas lease was suspended during Winkler's administrative
appeal, pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(a) (1978), which provides, in pertinent part: "[A] decision
will not be effective during the time in which a person adversely affected may file a notice of
appeal, and the timely filing of a notice of appeal will suspend the effect of the decision ap-
pealed from pending the decision on appeal."
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) provides that an action in federal court against real property
interests, including federal interests, must be recorded in the county office where the property is
located to constitute constructive notice to potential purchasers, if state law so requires. This
federal provision was triggered by state law. Wvo. STAT. § 1-6-108 provides, in part:
In an action in a state court or. in a United States district court affecting the title or
right of possession of real property . . . the plaintiff at the time of the filing of the
complaint . . . , may file in the office of the county clerk in which the property is
situate a notice of pendency of the action . . . . From the time of filing the notice a
subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer of the property shall have constructive notice
of the pendency of the action.
177. 614 F.2d at 709-10.
178. 30 U.S.C. § 184(h)(2) (1976).
179. 361 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1966). In Southwestern, the Tenth Circuit held that bona fide
purchaser status under 30 U.S.C. § 184 was to be determined by common law standards; je.,
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interest. Since Winkler had not filed a lis pendens on the contested lease, as
he was required to do under both federal and state law, Davis Oil could not
have been on constructive notice under the Wyoming standard. 180 The
court noted, however, that the test of constructive notice under Southwestern
is whether the circumstances are sufficient to put a man of ordinary pru-
dence on inquiry, an inquiry which, if diligently followed, would lead to
discovery of defects in title.18 1 Davis failed to conduct a title examination of
the Wyoming State Office BLM records before acquiring the lease assign-
ment. Davis contended that it is standard industry practice to conduct a
title examination only on lease assignments involving large cash payments.
The court of appeals rejected this argument as not supported by case prece-
dent.1 8 2 Under the Southwestern holding, as applied in O'Kane v. Walker,1 8 3 a
BLM record search is mandatory for bona fide purchaser status, since any
facts relevant to the situation would include notices of court action con-
tained in BLM records.
184
The Tenth Circuit emphasized that when Davis took its assignment,
BLM records reflected that Winkler had made an unsuccessful administra-
tive appeal. But Davis was also deemed to have constructive notice of the
applicable statutes, particularly section 226-2 of Title 30, which states that
an unsuccessful administrative appellant has ninety days after an adverse
IBLA decision to seek judicial relief.18 5 To be a bona fide purchaser Davis
Oil should have waited for the expiration of the ninety-day period before
taking its assignment. ' 86 The appellate court concluded by stating that the
general rule is that a person taking a real property interest does so at his peril
and that a lawsuit is considered pending until the time for appeal has
passed. 187 The district court decision was remanded for further hearings to
determine if Davis was a bona fide purchaser under the ordinary prudent
man standard of Southwestern.1
88
This decision apparently voids a long-standing oil and gas industry
practice of relying on BLM issuance of leases to qualify assignees as bona
fide purchasers. Assignees of second drawees must now wait until the ninety-
day appeal period has expired after an adverse decision of the IBLA to as-
sure themselves that no federal court action has been taken by the first
that he "acquired his interest in good faith, for valuable consideration, and without notice of
the violation of the departmental regulations." Id. at 656.
180. 614 F.2d at 712.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 713.
183. 561 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1977). In O'Kane, the assignee of a second drawee was held to
be a bona fide purchaser because he had employed an abstractor to conduct a title examination
of BLM records. The examination had produced no evidence of any adverse claims or interests.
184. 614 F.2d at 713.
185. Id. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1976) provides, in part: "No action contesting a decision of the
Secretary involving any oil and gas lease shall be maintained unless such action is commenced
or taken within ninety days after the final decision of the Secretary relating to such matter."
186. 614 F.2d at 714.
187. Id See Wilkin v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 854
(1952).
188. 614 F.2d at 714-15. The federal district court subsequently found that Davis Oil Com-
pany was not a bona fide purchaser and therefore the assignment of the lease issued to the
second drawee was void. Winkler v. Andrus, No. 76-127k (D. Wyo. Aug. 5, 1980).
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drawee. Alternatively, assignees could condition payment to drawees upon
the absence of any federal court action within the ninety-day period.
A question not answered by the Tenth Circuit is whether an assignee of
a first drawee who has been issued an oil and gas lease from the BLM can be
a bona fide purchaser before the initial thirty-day protest period has expired.
Past BLM practice has been to consider the first drawee's assignee a bona
fide purchaser even if a protest by the second or tiird drawee utimately is
upheld; in such cases the first drawee's overriding royalty has been cancelled
but the assignee has been allowed to retain the lease. Under the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision in this case, it would appear that the first drawee's assignee
would be required to wait until the thirty-day protest period has elapsed,
since the assignee is on constructive notice of this regulation. A related ques-
tion is whether the thirty-day period begins to run on the day of the drawing
or on the date the second drawee is notified by the BLM that the first
drawee's entry card is considered valid.
B. Grazing Allotment Reduction Drograms
In Valdez v. Applegate,18 9 the Tenth Circuit held that commencement of
a court action challenging a grazing management program operates to stay
implementation of the program until the case has been determined.'9 ° In
making this determination, the court of appeals apparently ignored the clear
implication of a provision in the November 27, 1979 Appropriations Act for
the Department of the Interior.)9 '
Pursuant to an Environmental Impact Statement prepared under an
order issued by the District of Columbia District Court in NRDC v. Mor-
ton,' 9 2 the BLM began implementation of the Rio Puerco Livestock Grazing
Management Program. The program called for reductions in grazing per-
mit areas, and some of the affected permittees instituted an action to enjoin
the implementation of the program. The federal district court denied the
motion for a preliminary injunction and the plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth
Circuit, which issued a stay of program implementation until it rendered a
decision. 193
The United States claimed that the issue was moot because of a provi-
sion in the 1979 Appropriations Act stating that reductions of grazing allot-
ments amounting to no more than ten percent were effective "when so
189. 616 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1980).
190. Id. at 573.
191. Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 954, 956 (1979) states in part:
Providedfurther, That an appeal of any reductions in grazing allotments on public
rangelands must be taken within 30 days after receipt of a final grazing allotment
decision or 90 days after the effective date of this Act in the case of reductions ordered
during 1979, whichever occurs later. Reductions of up to 10 per centum in grazing
allotments shall become effective when so designated by the Secretary of the Interior.
Upon appeal any proposed reduction in excess of 10 per centum shall be suspended
pending final action on the appeal, which shall be completed within 2 years after the
appeal is filed.
192. 388 F. Supp. 829, 838-41 (D.D.C. 1974), aJ'd, 527 F.2d 1386, (D.C. Cir.), cert. dented,
427 U.S. 913 (1976).
193. 616 F.2d at 571.
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designated by the Secretary."' 9 4 Since the grazing reductions being chal-
lenged were apparently within the ten percent limit, the United States ar-
gued that the reductions were effective immediately.
In rejecting this argument, the court relied on a provision in the 1976
Federal Land Policy and Management Act which states that "judicial re-
view of public land adjudication decisions be provided by law."' 9 5 The
court interpreted this to mean that implementation of a program affecting
public lands while the program was being judicially contested was "not con-
sonant with judicial review."'
9 6
The court further held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient
likelihood of success on the merits and a sufficient showing of irreparable
harm to warrant a preliminary injunction prohibiting program implementa-
tion until the case was determined on the merits. An apparently crucial
concern of the court was the fact that some permittees would be forced out of
their livestock operations and that the program's probability of success in
reducing costs to the permittees was questionable.' 9 7 However, by ignoring
the express provisions of the Appropriations Act, which gave the Secretary
discretionary power to implement grazing reductions of ten percent or less,
the court may have left itself open to the criticism that it exceeded statutory
limits.
C. Railroad Rights-of- Way
1. Mineral Interests in Railroad Rights-of-Way
The continuing controversy over mineral interests in railroad rights-of-
way grants resurfaced in Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Union Pacifw Rail-
road Co.,' 98 a consolidation of two decisions at the federal district court
level. 199 The Tenth Circuit disposed of two questions that have been plagu-
ing the courts for years-whether mineral reservations were granted to rail-
roads under the Union Pacific Railroad Act of 1862 (Act);20° and, if they
were, what type of mineral grant was envisioned. The court found that sec-
tion 2 of the Act,20 ' which granted the actual right-of-way for railroad con-
struction across the public domain, did not include the servient mineral
194. Id. See note 191 supra.
195. 616 F.2d at 572. See also 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(6) (1976).
196. 616 F.2d at 572.
197. Id.
198. 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979).
199. Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 456 F. Supp. 154 (D. Kan.
1978); Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 435 F. Supp. 313 (D. Wyo. 1977).
200. 12 Stat. 489, as amended by Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356.
201. Section 2 of the Act provides, in part:
IT]he right of way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to said
company for the construction of said railroad and telegraph line: and the right,
power, and authority is hereby given to said company to take from the public lands
adjacent to the line of said road, earth, stone, timber, and other materials for the
construction thereof; said right of way is granted to said railroad to the extent of two





estate, while the grant, under section 3,202 of alternate township sections ad-
joining the railroad did include the mineral estate.
20 3
Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. was planning to construct an un-
derground coal slurry pipeline from Wyoming to Arkansas. It had obtained
rights-of-way from successors to a Wyoming homestead patent issued in
1913, with neither a reservation of the _mineral s t in the Uted States
nor any mention of conflicting mineral interests by Union Pacific. Union
Pacific had a right-of-way granted pursuant to section 2 of the Act which cut
across the land and under which Energy Transportation Systems' pipeline
had to pass. Because Union Pacific would not allow the company to con-
struct the pipeline under Union Pacific's right-of-way, the coal slurry pipe
line company sought a declaratory judgment to determine what, if any, right
Union Pacific had to the mineral estate. The trial court found that Union
Pacific did not have title to the mineral estate beneath its right-of-way.
2°4
Union Pacific relied principally on Northern Pacift Railway Co. v. Town-
sena 0 5 as support for its claim that Union Pacific had been granted a lim-
ited fee which included the mineral estate. The district court, however,
distinguished the Northern Paqiic decision because that case had involved a
homestead patentee's claim to the surface estate of the adjoining railroad
right-of-way and did not address the railroad's mineral estate rights.2° 6 The
trial court then followed the holdings in United States v. Union Pacifc Railroad
Co.
2 0 7 and Wyoming v. Udall.208 The latter stated that the exception of min-
eral lands as reserved to the United States under section 3 also applied to
section 2 and that, therefore, the United States had a right to the oil and gas
underneath the right-of-way. Finding these decisions dispositive of the issue
in the case before it, the district court held that Union Pacific had only sur-
face rights in the section 2 right-of-way grant.
20 9
The Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion for those lands
granted as inducement for railroad construction under section 3 of the Act.
These grants were for odd-numbered township sections located in Kansas.
Union Pacific's successors conveyed these lands to the present title holder,
who had given Energy Transportation Systems an underground easement
for its pipeline. Union Pacific argued that the Northern Paqfic decision had
precluded the original railroad company from conveying its mineral estate
in the right-of-way adjacent to the odd-numbered sections when it trans-
ferred its title to a third party. The court of appeals noted that the Northern
202. Section 3 of the Act provides, in part:
[T]here be, and is hereby, granted to the said company, for the purpose of aiding in
the construction of said railroad . . . , every alternate section of public land, desig-
nated by odd numbers . . . , and within the limits of ten miles on each side of said
road, ....
203. 606 F.2d at 937-38.
204. 435 F. Supp. at 319.
205. 190 U.S. 267 (1903).
206. 606 F.2d at 936.
207. 353 U.S. 112 (1957). In this case, the Court held that the reservation of "mineral
lands" in section 3 of the Act also applied to the section 2 right-of-way grants and that, there-
fore, Union Pacific had no right to drill oil and gas wells on right-of-way lands.
208. 379 F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 985 (1967).
209. 606 F.2d at 937.
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Pacific Court's ruling, that a railroad cannot alienate its right-of-way grant,
pertained only to the surface estate. The Tenth Circuit declared that the
servient mineral estate could be conveyed by the railroad.
2 10
The appellate court's rationale is questionable because, if the railroad
did not have an interest in the mineral estate sufficient to justify oil and gas
exploration, as determined by the Supreme Court in Union Pacific,2 1' it ap-
pears implausible to assert that the railroad had the right to convey the min-
eral interest to a third party. A logical extension of the Union Pacif# decision
would be a holding that the mineral estate remained in the United States
and that any easement in the underground area should be obtained from the
United States as holder of the mineral interest. In any event, this decision
has resolved an important issue involving the right of a pipeline company to
cross the subsurface of railroad rights-of-way and has helped open the way
for development of coal slurry pipelines.
2. Railroad Rights-of-Way and State In-Lieu Selections
The Tenth Circuit addressed another aspect of railroad rights-of-way in
yoming v. Andrus.2 12 Wyoming filed a patent application for a school sec-
tion with the Wyoming BLM office in 1970,213 excluding that portion of the
school section traversed by a railroad right-of-way. The BLM informed Wy-
oming that it would issue a patent for the entire school section, subject to the
right-of-way easement. Wyoming then filed for a lieu land selection 2 "4 to
indemnify the state for the right-of-way area. The BLM refused to allow the
selection, stating that Wyoming was not entitled to lieu lands as indemnifi-
cation for the easement. Wyoming appealed the decision to the Interior
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), which upheld the BLM decision. 2 15 The
District Court for the District of Wyoming affirmed the IBLA decision.
216
The issue presented on appeal was whether the grant of a right-of-way
to a railroad, prior to the enactment of the Wyoming Enabling Act, was a
"prior disposition" that entitled Wyoming to lieu selections for that part of
the school section sold or otherwise disposed of.2 1 7 In finding that railroad
rights-of-way create surface rights only, with certain profit i prendre rights
to coal and iron ore, the court of appeals affirmed other recent decisions
210. Id. at 938.
211. The 1957 Unmon Pat fl decision implied that the railroad never had a right to mineral
lands as part of those alternate, odd-numbered sections granted by section 3 of the Act. 353
U.S. at 114.
212. 602 F.2d 1379 (10th Cir. 1979).
213. Wyoming filed the application pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1970), which statute
authorized the issuance of patents to states for certain township school sections. This statute
was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782
(1976). Patent applications which already were pending are protected under a savings clause in
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
214. Under 43 U.S.C. §§ 851-852 (1976), states are permitted to select indemnity lands, of
equal acreage, for those school sections to which the state was entitled but in which title did not
vest because of homestead claims, mining entrys, Indian, military or other reservations by the
United States, and those lands "otherwise disposed of by the United States . See also Act
of July 10, 1890, ch. 664 (Wyoming's Enabling Act), 26 Stat. 222.
215. State of Wyoming, 27 I.B.L.A. 137, 83 Interior Dec. 364 (1976).
216. Wyoming v. Andrus, 436 F. Supp. 933 (D. Wyo. 1977).
217. 43 U.S.C. § 851 (1976). See note 214 supra.
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concerning the type of interest conveyed by these grants.2 '8 The court noted
that, under the Act of July 1, 1862,219 Union Pacific Railroad Company was
given surface use only, through the grants of rights-of-way, with the United
States retaining a mineral reservation, except for coal and iron ore incident
to the use of the right-of-way. 220 The appellate court also relied on the as-
sumption that Congress was aware of the Union Pacific's right-of-way when
it passed the General indens• ification Act of ... ,221 which Act listed the
types of prior dispositions subject to in lieu selections by the states. Since
railroad rights-of-way were not listed specifically among those dispositions
for which a state could select lieu lands, the appellate court reasoned that
Congress did not intend to include the right-of-way grants as prior disposi-
tions.
222
The Tenth Circuit limited its earlier decision of Wyoming I. Uda//,223
wherein the court had held that although the 1862 Act did not give Union
Pacific or Wyoming a mineral interest in railroad rights-of-way, the right-of-
way grant constituted a "prior disposition. '224 The court reconciled this lat-
est decision by contending that its previous statements were dicta. The court
further noted that Wyoming's continuing claim to a reversionary interest in
the right-of-way, 225 was inconsistent with its argument that the land had
been previously disposed.2 26 Since the fee interest in these rights-of-way re-
mained in the United States, and since the legislative history and a contem-
poraneous opinion by the Secretary 227 indicated that these lands were not
considered among those subject to in lieu selections, the court of appeals held
that Wyoming had no right to claim lieu land for that portion of the school
section crossed by the railroad right-of-way.
228
218. Eg., Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir.
1979). See text accompanying notes 198-211 supra.
219. 12 Stat. 489 (1862).
220. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 113 (1957).
221. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 384, 26 Stat. 796 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 851 (1976)).
222. 602 F.2d at 1384.
223. 379 F.2d 635 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 985 (1967).
224. Id.
225. 602 F.2d at 1384. The court noted that its decision, in Wyoming v. Udall, that "neither
the railroad nor Wyoming was entitled to these minerals" indicated that there was no disposi-
tion of these lands by the United States in spite of its later use of the term "prior disposition."
This claim was brought under the Railroad Right-of-Way Abandonment Act, 43 U.S.C. § 912
(1976).
226. 602 F.2d at 1384.
227. The court gave considerable weight to an opinion issued by the Secretary of the
Interior at the time of Wyoming's Enabling Act in 189f, which stated, in reference to in lieu
selections:
No provision is made by law for indemnifying the state in cases where the school
section is crossed by railroads, claiming the right of way either under the act of March
3, 1875, or by a special grant from Congress ..... 13 Pub. Lands Dec. 454-55
(1891).
228. 602 F.2d at 1385-87. The debate over in lieu selections continues. The Supreme Court
recently overturned a Tenth Circuit decision which permitted states to select in lieu lands of
comparable mineral value to those school sections lost because of prior dispositions. Utah v.
Kleppe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978). In Andrus v. Utah, 100 S. Ct. 1803 (1980), the Court
held that it was within the discretionary power of the Secretary to determine those lands avail-
able for in lieu selections, even if their mineral value was much less than those lands lost. Utah
was claiming rights to lands rich in oil shale. See Umited States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit
Decisions within this Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, infa at 534.
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IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Two cases of importance in the environmental area were decided by the
Tenth Circuit in the last year. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 229 the
court of appeals held that variations in an approved plan for the production
of oil shale on federally leased land did not require a supplemental Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS), because the modifications would not cause
any different or more severe effects upon the surrounding area than those
environmental effects dealt with in the original EIS. In United States v. Texas
Pipehne Co., 230 the court reaffirmed its definition of "navigable stream"
under the Clean Water Act as established in United States v. Earth Sciences,
Inc.
23 1
A. Modifcation of Development Plans
The imminent federal oil shale leasing program by the Department of
Interior has come under attack by environmental groups. The possibilities
of severe and permanent alteration of land, air, and water quality incident to
a large scale oil shale industry has prompted environmental groups to chal-
lenge all aspects of the proposed leasing scheme. When Interior first pro-
posed an experimental prototype oil shale leasing program in 1969, the
Secretary issued a seven step procedure to be followed, with an exhaustive,
comprehensive EIS for all aspects of the proposed oil shale leasing pro-
gram.23 2 After approval of the final EIS, bonus bids were accepted. Two of
the lessees conducted baseline studies for site-specific analyses and issued
final environmental baseline reports in October, 1976. Detailed Develop-
ment Plans (DDP's) also were prepared in 1976. In 1977, modifications were
incorporated into the DDP's, principally for "in situ" retorting. The Secre-
tary determined that no supplemental EIS was necessary for these DDP's.
The Environmental Defense Fund filed suit to force the Secretary to prepare
a supplemental EIS for the "in situ" modifications.
2 33
Finding that a supplemental EIS for the modified "in situ" DDP's was
not necessary, the court of appeals emphasized that the requirements of the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) are procedural and do not
control internal departmental decision-making.2 34 The court also reiterated
229. 619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980).
230. 611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979).
231. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
232. The procedure included:
1) promulgation of an EIS;
2) approval of an overall prototype program based on the environmental description
and analysis of the EIS;
3) solicitation of competitive bids and awarding of leases for the tracts reviewed in
the EIS;
4) filing by the lessees of Detailed Development Plans (DDP's), supplements and
modifications thereto, if needed;
5) review and approval of the DDP's by the area oil shale supervisor;
6) specific site authorizations, such as rights-of-way; and
7) development of deposits on leased tracts in compliance with the terms of the lease
and the DDP.
619 F.2d at 1371.
233. Id. at 1370-74.
234. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
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its position that remote environmental effects of a proposed federal agency
action do not need detailed discussion in an EIS. The Tenth Circuit ad-
hered to the "rule of reason" standard established by the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals in NRDC v. Morton.2 35 Noting that the Environmental
Defense Fund had not disputed the adequacy of the 1973 EIS but was argu-
ing that supplemental, site-specific EIS's were required for the new, modified
in-situ retorting, the Tenth Circuit stated that NEPA did not mandate a
detailed analysis of every federal implementing action. NEPA requires only
that the agency take a "hard look" at the alternatives.
236
Relying on the standard of review for determining the adequacy of an
EIS set forth in Save Our Invaluable Land (Soil), Inc. v. Needham, 23 7 the Tenth
Circuit found that the 1973 EIS, which included programmatic, site-specific,
and regional analyses of the proposed oil shale leasing program, had ade-
quately discussed the environmental effects of the modified in-situ re-
torting. 238 Acknowledging that the modified in-situ plans had not been
specifically addressed, the court nevertheless held that the in-situ retorting
modification did not demonstrate any "unknown, undescribed, or unidenti-
fied" effects on the environment not previously noted in the original EIS.
239
Because the 1973 EIS contained a reasonable, good faith discussion of each
of the five NEPA procedural requirements for all future actions under the oil
shale leasing program, no separate, supplemental EIS was required. 24° Fol-
lowing the decision in Kleppe v. Sierra Club,24 t the Tenth Circuit restated that
an EIS need not resolve all of the issues incident to a proposed governmental
action. The EIS need only insure that all issues are identified fully, so that
435 U.S. 519 (1978); Jette v. Bergland, 579 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1978); Wyoming Outdoor Coordi-
nating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455
F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
235. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) wherein the court stated that:
We reiterate that the discussion of environmental effects of alternatives need not be
exhaustive. What is required is information sufficient to permit a reasoned choice of
alternatives so far as environmental aspects are concerned.
F . . urthermore, the requirement in NEPA of discussion as to reasonable alternatives
does not require "crystal ball" inquiry .... The statute must be construed in the
light of reason ....
Id. at 836-37.
236. See Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 560 (10th Cir. 1977).
237. 542 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977). The standard of review
established by the Tenth Circuit to determine EIS adequacy was 1) whether the EIS addressed
the five requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976); and 2) whether the EIS was a
good faith effort to comply with NEPA. Id. at 542-43.
238. 619 F.2d at 1382.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). In Kleppe, the Court held that a regional EIS was not a prerequi-
site for Interior's issuance of coal leases or for other activities incident to coal leasing. The
Secretary was in the process of completing an interim report on the potential impact of coal
development in the Northern Great Plains when the Sierra Club sued to enjoin him from fur-
ther leasing until the regional EIS was prepared. Noting that the Secretary had not proposed
any legislation or plan for the development of coal on a regional basis, the Court held that the
triggering provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976) had not been met. Id. at 398-402. The
Tenth Circuit found that implicit in the Kleppe decision was the approval by the Court of the
Secretary's procedures and actions in the preparation of the interim report, procedures similar
to the seven-step process employed in the instant case. 619 F.2d at 1377.
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agency personnel can make informed and reasoned choices.242
B. "Navigable Waters" in the Clean Water Act
In United States v. Texas Pipeline Co., 243 the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the
definition of "navigable waters" that it had established in United States v.
Earth Sciences, Inc.2 44 A pipeline owned by Texas Pipeline Company had
been hit by a bulldozer, causing the release of the equivalent of 600 barrels
of oil. Texas Pipeline immediately notified the Coast Guard and acted expe-
ditiously in constructing a temporary dam to contain the oil, but the Coast
Guard, after commending Texas Pipeline for its efforts, levied a $2,500 civil
penalty against the company under provisions of the Clean Water Act.
2 45
Texas Pipeline argued that because the creek into which the oil had run was
not a "navigable water" the provisions of the Act were not triggered. The
creek, an unnamed tributary of Clear Boggy Creek, ultimately emptied into
Red River; the tributary and creek had intermittent flows, generally only
after heavy rainfalls.
246
The Tenth Circuit held, as it had in Earth Sciences, that "navigable wa-
ters" under the Clean Water Act had a much broader definition than that
which is accorded the conventional meaning of "navigable. 2 4 7 The stream
involved in the Earth Sciences case was confined to one county where two
dams collected the entire flow; yet the stream was determined to be naviga-
ble because of its impact on interstate commerce.248 The water from the
unnamed tributary in the instant case eventually flowed into a large inter-
state river; therefore, the stream was included in the definition of navigable
waters contained in the Clean Water Act, regardless of whether there was
any water flowing in it, or in Clear Boggy Creek, at the time of the oil spill-
242. 619 F.2d at 1378.
243. 611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979).
244. 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
245. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1976), which provides, in part:
(3) The discharge of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the navtgable waters of
the United States . . .is prohibited ...
(6) Any owner or operator of any . . . , on shore facility, . . . from which oil or a
hazardous substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection
shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the department in which the
Coast Guard is operating of not more than $5,000 for each offense. (emphasis
added).
For a discussion of the fifth amendment implications of these provisions of the Clean Water
Act, see the comments on Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct.
2636 (1980) in United States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions within this Seventh
Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 67fra at 531.
246. 611 F.2d at 345.
247. Id. at 347. The definition of "navigable waters" in 33 U.S.C. § 1363(7) (1976) is "the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."
248. 599 F.2d at 374-75. Although recognizing that, by stipulation of both parties, the
stream was not "navigable in fact nor is it used to transport any goods or materials," the Tenth
Circuit found that the stream supported trout and beaver and water from the stream was used
for agricultural irrigation, from which products were "sold in interstate commerce." Id. at 375.
This constituted a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to bring the stream within the mean-
ing of "navigable waters" as intended by Congress. See S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,





The Tenth Circuit decided two cases in the water law area during the
past yea, r,./. A1pache 'flhe v. United Sates has been discussed previ-
ously. 250 The other water case concerned a continuing controversy over the
reservoir rights of Denver vis A vis the United States. In United States v. North-
ern Colorado Water Conservancy Ditrict25 1 the Tenth Circuit upheld a district
court decision which had concluded that Denver was precluded from raising
legal protests against the release of water from the Dillon Reservoir to the
Green Mountain Reservoir because of the city's participation in stipulations
in previous court decrees.
Green Mountain Reservoir was constructed in 1943 on the Blue River
on the eastern slope of the Colorado Rockies as part of the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project. The purpose of the project was to bring western slope
waters to the more developed eastern range. Approximately one-third of the
reservoir water is returned to the western slope, while the remainder is used
"primarily for power purposes" on the eastern slope. After the water is re-
leased, it is available without charge "to supply existing irrigation and do-
mestic appropriations of water. '25 2 In 1955, a stipulation was agreed upon
between the United States and several state appropriators, including Den-
ver, as to the water rights for the Colorado-Big Thompson Project and other
water uses on the Blue River. Section 4(a) of the stipulation, which was
incorporated into the 1955 decree of the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, reads:
The rights of the City and County of Denver and the City of Colo-
rado Springs are limited solely to municipal purposes as herein de-
scribed and subject to the rights of the United States of America to fill
each year the Green Mountain Reservoir to a capacity of 154,645
acre feet for utilization by the United States of America [for pow-
er generation] 253
After Denver completed construction of the Dillon Reservoir, upstream
from the Green Mountain Reservoir, in 1963, the city began to impound
water normally flowing into the federally-operated facility. Suit was filed by
the United States to enjoin Denver from continuing this impoundment; an-
other stipulation was entered by Denver following an April, 1964 decree. In
this second stipulated agreement, Denver acknowledged that the United
States had a right to fill the Green Mountain Reservoir to capacity each year
and that "Denver and Colorado Springs may not exercise their decreed right
to divert the waters of the Blue River except with approval by the Secretary
of the Interior.
254
249. 611 F.2d at 347.
250. See text accompanying notes 68-96 supra.
251. 608 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1979).
252. Id. at 425 (quoting S. Doc. No. 80, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937)).
253. Id. at 425-26.
254. Id. at 427.
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In the summer of 1977, following a winter of below average snowfall,
Denver refused to deliver 28,622 acre feet of water to the Green Mountain
Reservoir. The Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation stated that
this water was necessary to fill the Reservoir to its decreed capacity. A de-
claratory judgment action was subsequently filed against Denver. 255
The central issue confronting the Tenth Circuit was the interpretation
of a clause in the Senate document concerning the operation of the Green
Mountain Reservoir as it related to the subsequent stipulations. Denver con-
tended that since the primary purpose of the water stored in the Green
Mountain Reservoir was for "power purposes," the city should be able to
deliver to the United States an amount of electrical power equivalent to that
which would be generated if the water it was impounding in Dillon Reser-
voir were released. Denver asserted that because it had the right to use the
water for agricultural and domestic purposes, the United States electrical
generating right was subservient to Denver's uses.
256
The Tenth Circuit noted that Denver was neither a beneficiary of the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project nor a party to the Colorado River Compact
of 1922. Because of this, the city could not raise issues such as beneficial use.
Denver's rights were deemed limited to the 1955 and 1964 court-approved
stipulations, which expressly required Denver to release the water stored in
Dillon Reservoir until the storage capacity of the Green Mountain Reservoir
was filled. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's finding that:
[T]he 1955 decree determined that the United States' right to the
water [from the Blue River] was superior to Denver's; under the
1964 decree it was provided that Denver had no right, title or inter-
est in the Green Mountain Reservoir or in the water which the
United States may or is entitled to store therein; [and that] under
the 1964 decree, . . . Denver could not divert the Blue River
water except with approval by the Secretary.
25 7
Although no new legal ground was broken by this Tenth Circuit water
decision, the settlement of the case should resolve finally the long-standing
dispute as to which water rights are superior on the transmountain diversion
affected by the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. It is now apparent that
Denver's water rights in the Dillon Reservoir are subject to the superior
rights of the United States to fill the Green Mountain Reservoir to its annual
decreed capacity.
Stephen M Brown
255. Id. at 427-28.
256. Id. at 428.
257. Id. at 428-29.
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